The poker game is based on skill and strategy, but it’s also a game of deception. It can be difficult to distinguish between bluffing a player who knows the game, and taking advantage of a player who doesn’t. This is especially true in high-pressure situations. This is why many players use bluffing tactics to gain an edge.
This article presents an evolutionary game model that describes the evolution of overconfidence and bluffing in a population. The model shows that when players’ real capabilities are limited, they will use overconfidence and lying to compete for a limited resource. Overconfidence and bluffing are a powerful strategy to collect a limited resource because they help competitors convince rivals that the competitor is more competent than she really is. Overconfidence may increase conflict risk. The model shows that topological features of the network play a critical role in the evolution of overconfidence. In particular, increasing network heterogeneity could boost bluffing, and facilitate punishment for overconfidence.
The results show that the evolution of overconfidence and bluffing depends on the game’s payoff structure and the size of the network. Large d